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Kenneth
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Kenneth 1. Shapiro is President of Psychologists for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, do Psychology Department,
Bates College, Lewiston, ME 04240.

By way of introducing Psychologists
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
(PsyET A) to readers of the journal, I have
been asked to make some comments
about the organization and, from a personal point of view, to suggest some of
my own positions and views.

Rationale and Inception
Dr. Emmanuel Bernstein of Saranac
Lake, NY, and I began PsyET A 2 years
ago. While the group is independent of
the American Psychological Association
(APA), all of its present 160 members are
also members of APA. For a number of
reasons, we felt and continue to feel the
need for an independent group within
our profession that will concern itself
with psychology's treatment of animals.
At the time of PsyET A's inception,
psychological research was being singled
out for criticism on ethical grounds, beyond its proportionate share as but one
of the areas of scientific research (e.g., P.
Singer's Animal Liberation). For example,
it was claimed that psychology had had
more than its share of painful experiments
(as discussed in J. Diner's Physical and
Mental Suffering of Experimental Animals).
Within the profession, there was little
response or apparent recognition of this
criticism, the actual facts of the matter,
or the complex ethical issues that had
begun to be raised in moral philosophy
(e.g., T. Regan and P. Singer, Animal Rights
188

and Human Obligations). While organizing a symposium in 1980 to promote
discussion of these issues ("The Ethics of
Our Treatment of Animals," Bates College),
I found few psychologists ready or able
to give,.from my viewpoint, an adequate
account of the interests of the animals
utilized in psychological research.
Dr. Bernstein had been monitoring
the response to animal protection issues
within APA for a number of years. In
that period the primary APA committee
(CARE) charged with animal welfare
concerns was also charged with protecting scientific research. The guidelines
published by the committee ("Principles
for the Care and Use of Animals," 1971;
revised, 1979) were general, vague, brief,
and rarely invoked. In his testimony during the congressional hearings on the
"Use of Animals" (Subcommittee on
Science, Research, and Technology, October 1981 ), Dr. Perrie Adams, then chairperson of CARE, stated that the committee had received only two allegations of
abusive treatment in the past 5 years
and that, in both instances, it did not
find enough substantial evidence to merit
investigation. It had failed to investigate
the ethics of Dr. Lester Aronson's work
at the Museum of Natural History in
New York, a case that was widely aired
in popular and scientific media (for example, in "Animal Rights: NIH Cat Sex
Study Brings Grief to New York Museum,"
Science, 1976).
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Unfortunately, events since the formation of PsyET A have dramatically borne
out our concerns. The case and trials of
Dr. Edward Taub (lnt J Stud Anim Prob 3
(3):219, 1983) have been a trial for psychology as well. Two Maryland courts
have found Taub guilty under an anticruelty statute and NIH has permanently suspended a grant to Taub, but through
its Psychology Defense Fund, APA has
given Taub awards totaling $16,000 to
help pay for his defense. Further, the
APA's Ethics Committee exonerated Taub,
and the CARE committee is currently preparing a brochure emphasizing the contributions of animal research.
In the light of the largely defensive
character of these responses, PsyET A is
now renewing its effort to establish an
animal protection committee within
APA. While this undoubtedly will be a
slow process, we have had some encouragement, in that discussions between
PsyET A and the extant committees within APA have begun.
Besides organizational reform,
PsyET A is working as a force for education.
Two examples are (1) a contest to support student theses and independent studies on ethical issues; and (2) a project to
encourage authors of introductory texts
to add discussions of the ethics of the
use of animal subjects in research. Also,
we intend to develop a research arm,
which would attract funding for research
on such pertinent issues as attitudes to
animals and alternatives to the use of
animals.

Sorting Through the Ethical Issues
In my view, the contribution of
psychological research involving animals to our field has been, at best, a mixed
one. While not denying the impact of
animal studies on the directions the field
has taken, given the early choice to employ nonhuman animal subjects for a
major portion of research, I have to say
that the evaluation of that impact is no
simple matter. Of course, even if one
/NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 4[3} 1983
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were to accept unequivocally that that
strategy has borne fruit in terms of increasing our understanding, it is still false to
assume that the decision to use extensive
animal research was the only or even the
most effective path to have taken.
For example, it would have been
possible to develop "learning theory"
employing human volunteers rather
than animal subjects. And isn't it likely
that the importance of imagery in the
treatments that are, at least arguably,
derivative of learning theory would otherwise have been delimited much earlier,
as Drewett and Kani suggest in their article in Animals in Research (D. Sperlinger,
editor)? Or, wasn't the recent "discovery" of the importance of cognition in
therapy greatly delayed by the too exclusive use of animals as subjects? Putting ethical questions aside for a moment, the decision in the late nineteenth
century to wed experimental psychology to animal-lab research by adopting
such strategies as the construction of
animal models of human phenomena (as
detailed by B. Kuker-Reines, in Psychology
Experiments on Animals) was certainly
not an inevitable one and was, in many
ways, unfortunate.
If an evaluation of the contribution
and complex impact of animal research
in psychology is mixed (a position I can
only suggest here) and if at least some
nonhuman animals justly deserve moral
status and consideration, a conclusion
reached by the overwhelming weight of
recent arguments in moral philosophy, it
follows that the ethical restraints on our
use of animals ought to be stringent indeed. To begin to practically and concretely effect those constraints, I would
like to see a committee within APA
whose primary function and concern
would be animal welfare. This standing
committee would be charged with establishing and providing guidelines for
animal care committees within local research institutions. Such committees would
ideally include scientists, technicians, a
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veterinarian, an ethicist, and a person
from the animal welfare community. The
guidelines would include the provision of
a class of experiments that are expressly
prohibited on grounds independent of
consequentialist or utilitarian considerations. In the British psychologist Dr. Alice
Heim's term, certain experimental procedures are "intrinsically objectionable."
They belong to a category of investigations where ends do not justify the
means, where the rights of an individual
must trump those of any aggregate- human or otherwise. It would be the responsibility of the local animal care committees to decide what specific proposed
research belongs in this category.
If an experimental procedure were
deemed permissible on this first ground,
it would then be scrutinized on more
strictly scientific grounds. Is it "good
science?" Does it measure what it purports to? Is any intended extrapolation
to human phenomena compelling or reasonable?
Finally, the proposed research
would be assessed on utilitarian grounds.
Do its potential benefits outweigh its
costs? Costs and benefits would include
those incurred by nonhuman animals,
particularly those involved in the experiment, and the burden to reduce those
costs would fall on the scientist proposing the research. It is his or her responsibility to demonstrate that he has considered and explored all possible "alternatives." If he can first meet the criterion of justifying the particular use of
animals that is involved, he must then
also demonstrate that he is employing
the least intrusive procedure that is likely to obtain the effect he proposes to
study.
Implicit in these suggestions is an
acceptance of the principle that any
proposed experimental procedure is
vulnerable to the competing claims of
the animal subjects it requires, a principle long ago accepted with respect to
the use of human subjects.
190
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In the final analysis, the level of exploitation of animals that we will countenance is a social decision. However, I
have been impressed with philosophy's
role in bringing these particular issues to
our attention and in offering further
leads as to what our relation to other
animals can and ought to be. To complete these remarks, I would like to
point to some leads in this philosophical
literature which I feel deserve further
development.
It has been the tactic of much of
this literature to delve into the nature of
the boundary that we have set up between human and nonhuman animalstypically, either extending that boundary by critically challenging and then
lowering the traditional criteria as to
what kind of being is a fit object of
moral concern, or by "discovering" that
certain animals have had those traditional attributes all along that would let
them pass, if not as persons, at least as
individuals worthy of our moral consideration. In contrast to this focus, Hans
Jonas (in The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology, 1966) implies that we might well shift the locus
of our operations. In a brilliant chapter
entitled "To Move and to Feel," Jon as
directs us away from the defense or
capitulation of any supposedly peculiarly human territory to the distinction between animal and plant, in his terms, between "the animate" and "the inanimate."
He finds that the point of departure
of the "phenomenon of animality" from
the "vegetative mode of life" resides in
a concept of distance. Very briefly, on
motility and perception is built the
distance or gap between urge and attainment, between desire and satisfaction;
and in this deferred fulfillment is the
ground for purpose and emotion. Animality, then, is a state of being for which
the temporal and spatial distance of objects constitute a "world," as distinguished from the plant's relation to an
environment that is merely contiguous
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with itself. "The suffering intrinsic in
animal existence is thus primarily not
that of pain ... but that of want and fear"
(p. 1 OS) as his or her purposes may be
frustrated or threatened.
This ontology of animality implies
an obligation on the part of scientists to
study particular animal species in their

natural habitats. Only in this way can we
begin to grasp just what it is we deprive
them of when we place them in a lab
and make them the subjects of our experimentation. A less expl-oitative and
more sensitive ethic must be built on
such considerations.

Genetic Adaptation and Welfare
J. Van Rooijen
1. Van Rooijen is with the Department of Animal Husbandry, Agricultural University, Marijkeweg 40, 6079 PC
Wagingen, The Netherlands.

Introduction
Beilharz (1982) has pointed out that
into new kinds of environments, he states
it may be possible to adapt animals genthat, if individuals do not have the capaetically to existing husbandry systems,
city to adjust phenotypically, "adaptation
rather than adapt the systems to the aniof the population will require a rapid
mals, in order to improve animal welfare. · genetic response to prevent dying out of
While I am in fundamental agreement with
the population." This comment may sugBeilharz' way of thinking (Van Rooijen,
gest that one does not have to wait very
1982a), I am afraid that his statements
long for the animals to adapt successfulmay easily be misunderstood.
ly to intensive systems. He also notes
Beilharz says: "The evolutionary prothat it is likely that a rapid genetic recesses, if they are not obstructed or
sponse is accompanied by much "suffermisdirected, must lead to such a degree
ing." From this, one might conclude that
of adaptation that welfare will have to
suffering during such a process is only
be taken for granted, just as we can do
"natural," and is therefore justified.
no better than to take for granted the
Beilharz writes further that the prowelfare of any wild animal in its natural
cedure of adaptation "may have to be
habitat." From this statement, one might
approached in stages, if the environmenconclude all we have to do is wait, and
tal conditions aimed at are radically difthe animals will eventually adapt to inferent from those to which the animals
tensive systems. Concerning animals put
are now adapted." Because he fails to
/NT I STUD ANIM PROB 4[3) 1983
191

K.J. Shapiro

veterinarian, an ethicist, and a person
from the animal welfare community. The
guidelines would include the provision of
a class of experiments that are expressly
prohibited on grounds independent of
consequentialist or utilitarian considerations. In the British psychologist Dr. Alice
Heim's term, certain experimental procedures are "intrinsically objectionable."
They belong to a category of investigations where ends do not justify the
means, where the rights of an individual
must trump those of any aggregate- human or otherwise. It would be the responsibility of the local animal care committees to decide what specific proposed
research belongs in this category.
If an experimental procedure were
deemed permissible on this first ground,
it would then be scrutinized on more
strictly scientific grounds. Is it "good
science?" Does it measure what it purports to? Is any intended extrapolation
to human phenomena compelling or reasonable?
Finally, the proposed research
would be assessed on utilitarian grounds.
Do its potential benefits outweigh its
costs? Costs and benefits would include
those incurred by nonhuman animals,
particularly those involved in the experiment, and the burden to reduce those
costs would fall on the scientist proposing the research. It is his or her responsibility to demonstrate that he has considered and explored all possible "alternatives." If he can first meet the criterion of justifying the particular use of
animals that is involved, he must then
also demonstrate that he is employing
the least intrusive procedure that is likely to obtain the effect he proposes to
study.
Implicit in these suggestions is an
acceptance of the principle that any
proposed experimental procedure is
vulnerable to the competing claims of
the animal subjects it requires, a principle long ago accepted with respect to
the use of human subjects.
190

Comment

In the final analysis, the level of exploitation of animals that we will countenance is a social decision. However, I
have been impressed with philosophy's
role in bringing these particular issues to
our attention and in offering further
leads as to what our relation to other
animals can and ought to be. To complete these remarks, I would like to
point to some leads in this philosophical
literature which I feel deserve further
development.
It has been the tactic of much of
this literature to delve into the nature of
the boundary that we have set up between human and nonhuman animalstypically, either extending that boundary by critically challenging and then
lowering the traditional criteria as to
what kind of being is a fit object of
moral concern, or by "discovering" that
certain animals have had those traditional attributes all along that would let
them pass, if not as persons, at least as
individuals worthy of our moral consideration. In contrast to this focus, Hans
Jonas (in The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology, 1966) implies that we might well shift the locus
of our operations. In a brilliant chapter
entitled "To Move and to Feel," Jon as
directs us away from the defense or
capitulation of any supposedly peculiarly human territory to the distinction between animal and plant, in his terms, between "the animate" and "the inanimate."
He finds that the point of departure
of the "phenomenon of animality" from
the "vegetative mode of life" resides in
a concept of distance. Very briefly, on
motility and perception is built the
distance or gap between urge and attainment, between desire and satisfaction;
and in this deferred fulfillment is the
ground for purpose and emotion. Animality, then, is a state of being for which
the temporal and spatial distance of objects constitute a "world," as distinguished from the plant's relation to an
environment that is merely contiguous
/NT I STUD ANIM PROB 4{3) 1983

K.J. Shapiro

Comment

with itself. "The suffering intrinsic in
animal existence is thus primarily not
that of pain ... but that of want and fear"
(p. 1 OS) as his or her purposes may be
frustrated or threatened.
This ontology of animality implies
an obligation on the part of scientists to
study particular animal species in their

natural habitats. Only in this way can we
begin to grasp just what it is we deprive
them of when we place them in a lab
and make them the subjects of our experimentation. A less expl-oitative and
more sensitive ethic must be built on
such considerations.

Genetic Adaptation and Welfare
J. Van Rooijen
1. Van Rooijen is with the Department of Animal Husbandry, Agricultural University, Marijkeweg 40, 6079 PC
Wagingen, The Netherlands.

Introduction
Beilharz (1982) has pointed out that
into new kinds of environments, he states
it may be possible to adapt animals genthat, if individuals do not have the capaetically to existing husbandry systems,
city to adjust phenotypically, "adaptation
rather than adapt the systems to the aniof the population will require a rapid
mals, in order to improve animal welfare. · genetic response to prevent dying out of
While I am in fundamental agreement with
the population." This comment may sugBeilharz' way of thinking (Van Rooijen,
gest that one does not have to wait very
1982a), I am afraid that his statements
long for the animals to adapt successfulmay easily be misunderstood.
ly to intensive systems. He also notes
Beilharz says: "The evolutionary prothat it is likely that a rapid genetic recesses, if they are not obstructed or
sponse is accompanied by much "suffermisdirected, must lead to such a degree
ing." From this, one might conclude that
of adaptation that welfare will have to
suffering during such a process is only
be taken for granted, just as we can do
"natural," and is therefore justified.
no better than to take for granted the
Beilharz writes further that the prowelfare of any wild animal in its natural
cedure of adaptation "may have to be
habitat." From this statement, one might
approached in stages, if the environmenconclude all we have to do is wait, and
tal conditions aimed at are radically difthe animals will eventually adapt to inferent from those to which the animals
tensive systems. Concerning animals put
are now adapted." Because he fails to
/NT I STUD ANIM PROB 4[3) 1983
191

